Let (X,d) be a metric space and q:X→R be a function defined on X.
The metric d:X→N takes only integer values.
For an x∈X, it neighbors an x′∈X, termed x∼x′, if d(x,x′)=1.
Further, define the global sensitivity Δ of q as:
Δ≐x∼x′max∣q(x)−q(x′)∣
The Laplace mechanism M of q adds random noise N∼Lap(εΔ) to the output of q:
M(x)≐q(x)+N
where Lap(εΔ) is the Laplacian distribution with parameter εΔ.
It guarantees that if x∼x′, the output distributions of M(x) and M(x′) are indistinguishable in the sense that for all S⊂R, s.t. S is measurable, it holds that
Pr[M(x)∈S]∈[e−ε,eε]⋅Pr[M(x′)∈S]
The value of Δ could be large and is independent of an x∈X.
We would like to investigate the possibility of adding a smaller noise than Lap(εΔ).
For a fixed x, we can define the local sensitivity with respect to x as
δ(x)≐x′∼xmax∣q(x)−q(x′)∣.
Here the maximum is over the neighbors of a fixed x. The value between Δ and δ(x) is quite different.
Example. Let
X≐[0,100]3.
d(x,x′)≐# different values between x and x′.
q(x)≐min1≤i<j≤3∣xi−xj∣, where xi is the i-dimension of x.
Then for the point x=(0,0,0)∈[0,100]3, if x′∼x, x′ contains at least two zeros in some of its dimensions.
Therefore, q(x′)=0 and δ(x)=0.
But for x=(0,0,100), it has a neighbor x′=(0,50,100).
Now q(x)=0 but q(x′)=50. So Δ≥δ(x)≥50.
We are interested in whether adding smaller noise N∼Lap(εδ(x)) to the output of q(x) would preserve privacy:
M(x)=q(x)+N.
However, this approach is not private.
In the previous example, (0,0,0) and (0,0,100) are neighbors.
But for the former we add noise N∼Lap(0) and for the latter we add noise N∼Lap(ε50).
So the output distributions of them are very different and this would violate privacy protection.
Perhaps, we should propose some fixed parameter β>0 (which could be much smaller than Δ), and add a noise N∼Lap(εβ) for whatever x∈X.
For a pair of neighboring x,x′, when ∣q(x)−q(x′)∣≤β, then the distributions of q(x)+N and q(x′)+N are indeed (ε,0) indistinguishable.
The only concern is for the case where ∣q(x)−q(x′)∣>β and adding a noise N∼Lap(εβ) fails to protect the privacy.
One simple remedy is simply to refuse to output q(x)+N (or q(x)+N′). This should be done in a differentially private manner. Let
{y∈X:δ(y)>β}
be the set of points with local sensitivity greater than β. For a fixed x, define d(x,{y:δ(y)>β}) be its distance to the set. It follows that for x∼x′,
∣d(x,{y∈X:δ(y)>β})−d(x′,{y∈X:δ(y)>β})∣≤1.
This motivates the following propose-test-release algorithm.
Propose a bound β on local sensitivity.
Compute d^≐d(x,{y∈X:δ(y)>β})+Lap(1/ε).
If d^≤ε1lnγ1 then output ⊥.
Else output q(x)+Lap(β/ε).
Theorem. The algorithm is (2ε,γ/2) differentially private.
Proof.
First observe that for two neighboring x,x′, their probabilities of outputting ⊥ are similar.
[1] S. Vadhan, “The Complexity of Differential Privacy,” in Tutorials on the Foundations of Cryptography, Y. Lindell, Ed. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 347–450.